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Preface 
 
Over the last decade, inequality in Japan has received an increasing amount of attention. 
Japan used to be a very equal society where 90% of the people thought of themselves as 
middle class. However the dominant phrase in Japanese society nowadays is ‘all Japanese are 
poor’(Nomura, 2014). This phrase might sound rather odd, considering that Japan is an 
affluent country of the ‘first world’. However, it refers to the widening economic inequality in 
Japan that has taken place since the economic crisis in the 1990s also named the ‘burst of the 
bubble’. The crisis resulted in many debates on the causes of economic inequality. This paper 
will investigate the effects of labor market duality on inequality. In Japan both labor market 
duality and inequality have risen after the ‘burst of the bubble’. Recently, prime minister Abe 
Shinzo formulated three ‘arrows’ that would ‘cure’ the Japanese economy. These three arrows 
were mainly aimed at restructuring the Japanese economy in order to become more 
competitive. The third arrow; structural reform would aim to tackle the problems in the labor 
market but its exact contents kept changing. There has been some research into the effects of 
‘Abenomics’ on economic inequality by Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama (2015) and Saiki & 
Frost (2014). However they have not been conclusive about the effects of the third arrow. 
Mainly because the contents of its policies remained unclear. This thesis will investigate the 
effect that the third arrow of Abenomics has had on economic inequality in Japan. Examining 
the third arrow of Abenomics enables us to take a look at the relationship between labor 
(reform) and economic inequality.  
In order to examine the effects of the third arrow of Abenomics it is necessary to first define 
inequality and to explore theories about the effects of labor (market duality) on economic 
inequality. Once the theoretical framework is established the problems that the Japanese labor 
market has faced will be described in order to show the previous situation that has led prime-
minister Abe Shinzo to formulate his policies. After this the three arrows of Abenomics are 
examined. The effect of the first and second arrows on inequality are handled briefly because 
previous research has already examined these more thoroughly
1
. Then we can examine the 
effects of the third arrow of Abenomics, for this we use data on economic inequality in Japan. 
Then we use theories to show how inequality was affected by the third arrow of Abenomics. 
In this process the applicability of certain theories about the effects of labor market duality on 
inequality are tested as well.  
                                                          
1
 Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama (2015) and Saiki & Frost (2014) 
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Theoretical Framework 
What is inequality and why is it a problem? 
In an unequal society, social resources are not distributed in a balanced manner. Wealth, 
prestige, power and information are not distributed evenly and people do not have the same 
opportunities to acquire them(Kawashima, 2011, p.22). A certain level of inequality needs to 
exist in order to give people incentives to work hard, because that would lead to the 
attribution of more social resources. People can perceive an unequal society as fair, as long as 
some level of distributive equality is achieved(Kawashima, 2011, pp.31-33). A lot of this 
perceived fairness depends on the so-called ‘equity principle’. When people believe that 
social resources can be acquired through good performance and results, they are more likely 
to judge the existing inequality as ‘fair’. As opposed to people who believe that social 
resources are distributed through chance or luck instead of hard work and are more likely to 
believe the existing inequality to be ‘unfair’(Kawashima, 2011, p.32). If basic goods are 
widely distributed in a society and people believe that social resources are acquired by hard 
work rather than chance, people tend to judge the existing inequalities as ‘fair’(Kawashima, 
2011, p.33).  
The relationship between inequality and economic growth is contested. In this thesis, the 
assumption will be made that inequality has a negative influence on economic growth in the 
long term. However, in the short term or medium term it might have positive effects on 
economic growth(Frobes, 2000, p.885). According to the OECD there would be an increase in 
economic growth by 0.8% in the following five years for a reduction of 1 point in the Gini 
coefficient(OECD, 2015, p.67). If inequality is lowered by reducing income inequality at the 
bottom it has a positive effect on economic growth(Andrews, Jencks & Leigh, 2011, p.30). 
The OECD found that changes in top income inequality did not have a statistically significant 
impact on economic growth, see figure 3. High income inequality in the top might provide 
incentives to obtain high rewards through risky investments and thus create economic growth. 
However, they found the effect to be insignificant. Instead it finds evidence in support of the 
‘human capital accumulation theory’(OECD, 2015, pp.70-71). The human capital 
accumulation theory states that people who do not have the resources to invest in education 
are unable to achieve their full output potential leading to lower aggregate output(OECD, 
2015, p.61). In the lower parts of income distribution some jobs do not provide opportunities 
for promotion or further training. This can cause an employee to become less productive 
because he/she lacks the opportunities to improve his/her own skills and wealth. Because 
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these workers become less productive, high levels of inequality have a negative effect on 
economic growth, see figure 1(Levy, 2016, p.19). 
This confirms results of earlier researches that found that human capital influenced growth. 
Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001) that one additional year of education increased aggregate output 
by 6%(Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001, p.24) and of Bénabou (1996) who found that the human 
capital accumulation theory best explained the differences in development between Korea and 
the Philippines statistically(Bénabou, 1996, p.61). Boeri & Garibaldi (2007) found that 
temporary employment has a negative impact on productivity. As the number of temporary 
workers increases, productivity decreases, because the marginal productivity of every 
additional worker is diminishing. The productivity diminishes for every additional worker 
because employers are less willing to invest in the improvement of skills of temporary 
workers(Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007, pp.376-378). 
Furthermore, in societies with high levels of inequality the probability of being unemployed is 
higher for people with a lower economic background, while it remains unaffected for richer 
individuals. Inequality thus affects people with a lower economic background 
disproportionately. Since there are less opportunities in educational attainment for lower 
income individuals in these unequal societies, there is a low level of social mobility, see 
figure 4(OECD, 2015, pp.78-79). When combined with the equity principle, this would mean 
that this type of societies would be described as ‘unfair’, since the opportunities to obtain 
social resources are not evenly distributed between different economic backgrounds.  
 
Figure 1 Productivity diminishes with growth (Benhabib, 2003, p.503) 
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Figure 2 The negative impact of inequality on growth in OECD countries (OECD, 2015, p.66) 
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Figure 3 Inequality at the bottom and the top of income distribution (OECD, 2015, p.70) 
 
 
Figure 4 PEB and inequality (OECD, 2015, p.72) 
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Labor market duality 
Labor market duality is an extreme form of labor market segregation. It occurs when the wage 
and non-wage benefits between primary and secondary sector workers are very different from 
each other. These two sectors are often divided between regular and non-standard work 
(NSW). NSW often consists of part-time or temporary work, fixed-term contracts or self-
employment
2
(Choi, 2016, p.1). The non-regular workers often receive less wage and non-
wage benefits than regular employees. After financial crises firms often look for ways to cut 
costs because of the fallen aggregate demand. Instead of hiring permanent employees they 
tend to hire non-regular workers because they are cheaper
3 (Brkić, 2015, p.28). After a 
financial crisis this pattern is seen everywhere
4
. Non-regular workers are the first to go in 
order to cut costs and are hired instead of permanent employees when demand returns. 
Especially in countries where job protection of ‘regular’ jobs is high, there tends to be a 
higher rate of temporary employment, since the strict labor laws do not apply to the temporary 
workers(OECD, 2015, pp.137-141). As a result of strong job protection laws, there may be an 
increase in NSW in contrast to regular employment, resulting in increasing income inequality.  
However, labor market duality has its costs, especially for non-regular workers. Since 
disparities in wages are the main cause of income inequality, the distribution of labor affects 
inequality. In most OECD countries there has been a rise in inequality, most often as a result 
of a change in income which in turn is caused by changes in the structure of the labor 
market(Brkić, 2015, p.12). First of all, non-regular workers receive lower wages than their 
permanent counterparts. Therefore these lower wages tend to be at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution, thereby further increasing income inequality. In some countries, including Japan 
and Korea, part-time workers earn around 60% less than the hourly wage paid for regular 
workers(Grubb, Lee & Tergeist, 2007, p.24). This difference can be explained as a result of 
the type of jobs that are offered in NSW. These jobs are often concentrated in the service 
sector and their employees usually have a low educational background. Other explanations are 
the share of women in NSW who face overall occupational segregation and the need to 
compensate the costs for the regular employees by reducing the wages of NSW. Even when 
controlled for personal, family or work conditions the wage gap between temporary workers 
and regular workers remains around 11% for men and 13% for women in OECD countries. 
                                                          
2
 Part-time workers: both fixed-term and open-ended, part-time, direct employment. Temporary workers: 
relatively short fixed-term, fulltime, direct employment 
3
 Since their wages, the costs of firing them and non-wage benefits are lower than for regular employees 
4
 Extensive researches about this effect have been done about for example Croatia, Korea and Spain (Choi, 2016) 
(Brkić, 2015) 
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The same is true for the wage gap between part-time workers and regular workers
5
(OECD, 
2015, pp.155-156). In addition to this, the wages of non-regular workers tend to grow at a 
slower rate than those of regular workers, creating more difference between wages of non-
regular and regular workers(Grubb, Lee & Tergeist, 2007, p.25). These disadvantages of 
NSW are not overcome by higher education; people in NSW with high education experience 
the same wage gap
6
(OECD, 2015, pp.154-158). 
 
Because the NSW tend to be concentrated in low-wage occupations, the lack of human capital 
could also explain the difference in wages. However, in these positions, non-regular workers 
do not accumulate human capital and do not receive promotion, and as a result do not receive 
higher wages. Non-regular workers receive less training than regular workers. Their non-
permanent status causes their employers to think that the costs of the training outweigh the 
benefits of a more productive employee. Since the replacement rate is high it is a logical 
decision for the employer. However, for non-regular workers this means that they do not 
acquire human capital further limiting their chance to transit into regular employment(Choi, 
2016, p.4).  
In addition to receiving less wage and training than their permanent counterparts, non-regular 
workers also receive less non-wage benefits. These non-wage benefits include bonuses, 
overtime-pay or team-based bonuses(OECD, 2015, p.154). Especially in countries such as 
Korea and Japan, where social insurance is largely connected to companies, the unavailability 
of such non-wage benefits for non-regular workers contributes to the inequality between 
regular and non-regular workers(Choi, 2016, pp.3-4).  
Another way of looking at NSW is that it is at least better for human capital and wage 
prospects than unemployment. We ought to look at non-regular work as a ‘stepping-stone’ to 
permanent employment. However, if the labor market duality is highly segmented, people in 
part-time or self-employment do not have a higher chance to transit to stable employment 
than unemployed people
7
. In OECD countries, temporary employees usually have a fifty-fifty 
chance of being hired permanently within three years, older male employees have a higher 
                                                          
5
 For men in part-time temporary positions the wage gap is 13% and 9% for permanent part-timers. For women 
the wage gap for part-time temporary workers is 12% and 4% for permanent part-timers 
6
 The theory of labor market duality states that employees in secondary sectors receive lower wages because of 
their perceived productivity. The fact that people with high education and thus skills experience the same wage 
gap proves that employers pay according to perceived productivity and not actual productivity(Gordon, 1972, 
pp.46-49) 
7
People with temporary contracts do have a higher chance than unemployed people to obtain stable employment, 
these people tend to be higher educated/ higher income individuals. 
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probability than their younger or female counterparts. Self-employed or part-time workers do 
not have a higher chance to obtain regular employment than the unemployed. Retention is 
high; around two thirds tend to stay in part-time functions(OECD, 2015, pp.162-167). Other 
studies found similar results; in Korea 3 out of 5 people remain in non-regular 
employment
8
(Grubb, Lee & Tergeist, 2007, pp.30-31) In some countries non-regular workers 
might even be in similar financial situations as unemployed people when the non-regular 
worker does not live with a regular worker. This is the result of taxes and redistributive 
policies such as welfare and might create a disincentive to find (non-regular) work. The 
people who do work under these circumstances are called the ‘working poor’(OECD, 2015, 
pp.178-179). In many OECD countries, the incentive to move from inactivity to part-time 
work is low, since most of the acquired income would be “taken away” by the loss of benefits 
and the increase in taxes to be paid(OECD, 2015, p.185).  
This is not to say that temporary employment does not have its benefits for both firms and 
workers. Young people might profit from an easier transition from education to employment 
and the firms are able to screen the temporary employees before hiring them for the 
permanent positions that are more secure(Brkić, 2015, p.12). During recession, governments 
often need to cut spending as well, which may lead to a reduction in unemployment benefits 
which causes temporary jobs to become more attractive alternatives to unemployment for 
women or low educated/experienced workers(Boeri & Terrel, 2002, p.70).  
Conclusion 
NSW does contribute to increasing economic inequality because of its effect on income 
inequality. This is not to say that non-regular employment does not have its benefits; some 
people (single parents, students etc.) prefer to work in NSW and businesses benefit from the 
increased flexibility and lower costs. Furthermore, when unemployment benefits are low, it 
will be a good alternative for people who are unable to work in regular jobs. However, there 
are some issues with non-regular employment. The working conditions and the wages are 
often lower than in regular employment. Within companies non-regular workers are less 
likely to receive promotion or training than regular employees. Moreover, mobility from 
temporary to permanent jobs is low. As a result of the lack of opportunities and the working 
conditions these workers become demotivated and their productivity decreases which is also 
undesirable for the firms(Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007, pp.376-378). As a result of these 
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circumstances that non-regular workers face, income inequality has grown and will continue 
to do so if nothing is done to compensate for the disparities between regular and non-regular 
workers.  
Hypothesis 
H1: The third arrow of Abenomics has not decreased economic inequality in Japan. 
The third arrow should have consisted of structural reforms in the Japanese labor market and 
stated it wanted to reduce labor market duality. As described above, non-regular employees 
receive less wage and non-wage benefits than regular employees and experience low mobility 
to regular employment. Since the labor market segmentation in Japan is high, it contributes 
significantly to income inequality(OECD, 2015, pp.137-141). The arrow has not been 
launched correctly and the Abe administration has failed to formulate policies to reduce labor 
market duality. In Korea anti-discrimination policies were implemented and the targeted non-
regular workers benefited at the expense of non-targeted non-regular employees and regular 
workers(Choi, 2016, pp.14-15). Japan has not formulated such policies and as a result 
inequalities between regular and non-regular employment remain intact. Because high labor 
market duality is a cause of income inequality, and the third arrow has failed to formulate 
policies to address it, inequality in Japan has risen.  
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Problems of the Japanese labor market 
 
Before the economic crisis of the 1990s, it was normal for companies to provide insurance, 
pensions and other benefits to their employees in the system of ‘life-long employment’. In this 
‘life-long employment’ system an employee, usually male, would work his entire life at one 
company, which in turn for his loyalty would provide welfare benefits in addition to ‘on-the-
job-training’. By working hard in a company, one could work ones way up to the top ranks of 
the company thereby increasing their income as well. Thus in the ‘life-long employment’ 
system, intercompany mobility was possible if you worked hard and had a full-time job. This 
is not to say that there was no non-regular employment before ‘the burst of the bubble’. 
Companies often used non-regular workers to increase the flexibility of their firms. However, 
for these non-regular workers there was upward social mobility because they could become 
regular workers through hard work and loyalty(Lechevalier, 2014, pp.87-91).  
The redistribution policies of the Japanese government mostly took place between regions 
rather than social classes. The social protection system was mainly focused on expenditures 
on health care and pensions and less on social assistance, family policies and unemployment 
insurance, since the unemployment rates were so low. The Japanese government did not 
intervene much within the labor market and there were generally low levels of social 
regulation with the exception of dismissal regulation. This was because the government and 
the companies worked close together, a concept also known as ‘Japan Inc.’ but also because 
of the underlying political situation. For example, the Japanese welfare system cannot be 
categorized according to a certain political view like right-wing or left-wing. Unions and the 
left wing played no main role within the development of the welfare system. The ruling party, 
the Liberal Conservative Party of Japan (LDP), although mainly conservative has varying 
views depending on the subject and voters’ mentality. This is why the welfare system has not 
developed among clearly defined right or left views and more on what the LDP thought voters 
wanted. The LDP has almost exclusively led the parliament in post-war Japan, hence its ties 
with businesses and its voters base are deeply integrated(Lechevalier, 2014, pp.87-91).  
After the ‘burst of the bubble’ the life-long employment system became too expensive to 
maintain for companies. Providing insurance, pension, welfare benefits etc. was too difficult 
in this time of crisis. During the crisis, some employees were laid off and no life-long 
contracts were offered to new recruits. Instead of offering those contracts, companies turned 
to ‘non-regular’ contracts. Social benefits were not extended to people within NSW and the 
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labor laws were less strict, making this sort of employment less stable(Lechevalier, 2014, 
pp.95-104). 
In order to restructure, companies cut costs on salaries of the senior employees and in order to 
create more non-regular jobs for young people senior employees were offered early retirement. 
However, for some the pensions have not been enough to support themselves and their spouse 
and it is only through redistributive government policies that most have been able to retain a 
decent life-style(Takanami, 2010, pp.16-31).  
As a result of the shift from regular to non-regular contracts, economic inequality has widened 
between those who have regular employment and those who do not(Gordon, 2014, pp.314-
315). Inequality has not increased because the rich have become more numerous but because 
the number of ‘poor’ people has increased, resulting in the phrase ‘all Japanese are 
poor’(Lechevalier, 2014, pp.91-98). Dealing with these issues has proved to be a problem for 
the Japanese government. This was mainly caused by a misdiagnose of the causes of the rise 
of inequality(Gordon, 2014, p.433). The causes of the higher inequality, were unemployment, 
the increase in non-regular employees and the weakness of the social security system. In the 
aftermath, redistribution policies have strengthened the effect of the social security systems by 
improving the conditions of the elderly thus shrinking the effect of the social security system 
on inequality. Even with these redistribution policies the Gini coefficient after redistribution 
had increased since it only benefits the elderly(Takanami, 2010, pp.15-26). 
Because of the crisis the weaknesses of the system were exposed. Not only the lower working 
class but also the middle class became exposed to the problems of non-regular employment. 
They were no longer receiving health benefits or insurances from their companies, worked in 
more unstable jobs and had less opportunities to receive a raise or training(Ishida & Slater, 
2010, p.163). This combined with a social security system that mainly focused on the elderly 
meant that inequality rose in Japan(Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005, pp.455-456). Even though 
the Japanese public and media focused on this issue and described it as an undesirable 
situation, not much was done by the government to address the growing social disparities.  
The public discontent combined with the 2008 global financial crisis caused a historical 
electoral result. The ruling party, the LDP, who had been in power since 1955 with a brief 
interception from 1993-1994 lost the elections to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009. 
The DPJ took hold of 308 of the 480 seats in the parliament and the LDP only 119. After 
some corruption scandals and the inability to fulfill his election promises DPJ Prime-Minister 
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Hatoyama decided to step down and new elections were called in 2012 in which the LDP won 
294 seats with Abe Shinzo’s election promises of Abenomics(Tiberghien, 2014, pp.45-52). 
Conclusion 
Because of perceived social mobility through hard work, people saw pre-crisis Japan as a ‘fair’ 
and equal society. After the ‘burst of the bubble’ this view changed. Unemployment rose and 
people who used to get into stable ‘regular’ employment now had to work in non-regular jobs 
with less stability and worse working conditions and salaries. It was not immediately noticed 
that unemployment, increase in non-regular employment and the weak social security system 
were the main causes of the rise in inequality. Because of public pressure the social security 
system has become somewhat stronger but still is mainly beneficial for the elderly while not 
being very supportive towards other groups in need. The increase in inequality combined with 
lower intercompany mobility causes the Japanese to perceive their society as increasingly 
‘unfair’ and unequal. This in turn shook up the LDP when they failed to be elected and saw 
that they needed to address the problems more actively to satisfy the voters.  
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The first and second arrows of Abenomics 
 
After the electoral loss of 2009, the LDP saw that it had to take action to win voters back
9
. 
People were discontent with the status of the Japanese economy. Aware of the public opinion 
about the lost glory of ‘Japan Inc.’, Shinzo Abe of the LDP came with a new strategy during 
the 2012 elections. He formulated the idea of ‘Abenomics’; a grand plan to revive the 
Japanese economy with the use of three ‘arrows’. These three arrows are monetary expansion, 
fiscal stimulus and structural reforms. The first arrow; also called quantitative and qualitative 
easing, was released immediately 
after the election(Hausman & 
Wieland, 2014, p.2). The second 
arrow; fiscal stimulus, was released in 
2013 as 1% of the GDP. However, a 
year later the consumption tax was 
implemented. This tax had been 
passed by the parliament before Abe 
took office and was no part of 
Abenomics but it did influence the 
effect of the fiscal stimulus and public 
opinion(Hausman & Wieland, 2014, 
pp.3-4). 
The first and second arrows have helped Japan escape from deflation. In an IMF working 
paper, Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama have analyzed the effects of the first two arrows on 
inclusive growth. They argue that inclusive growth is needed because it both supports the 
reforms needed to revive the Japanese economy
10
 and because inequality is bad for economic 
growth and social cohesion(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, p.3). They assess that the 
influence of the first two arrows on growth in 2013 has been an increase of between 1.1 and 
1.8 percentage points which was mainly caused by expansionary monetary policy(Aoyagi, 
Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, p.4). According to them this indeed induces growth as long as the 
inflation is kept below 2%. The inflation rate does influence equality, however the authors 
assess this as insignificantly small(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, pp.17-18). The 
authors of the IMF working paper also predict that if monetary policy would be overburdened, 
                                                          
9
 As described in ‘Problems of the Japanese labor market 
10
 The third arrow 
 
Figure 5 Inflation Rate Japan  
Source: Japan Statistics Bureau. Ycharts 
https://ycharts.com/indicators/japan_inflation_rate 
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the inflation would hike beyond 2% and as a result inclusive growth would be 
reduced(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, pp.22-23). The inflation hiked beyond 2% in 
2014 after which the inflation rate was soon brought back to zero, as can be seen in figure 5. 
After the launch of the first arrow, the stock market reacted immediately and the yen 
depreciated, the wages did not rise and only the rich seemed to benefit from the first arrow 
since they were able to profit from their stocks that had increased in value. The higher asset 
prices did not benefit lower income households since their savings typically consist of bank 
deposits which gained little nominal interest(Saiki & Frost, 2014, p.4447).  
Fiscal stimulus, the second arrow, was not used for income redistribution. Therefore wages 
remained flat during 2013-2014, unemployment remained the same as well and structural 
reforms were not implemented yet. This meant that Saiki & Frost (2014) were able to assess 
the effect of the first arrow without the other two distorting the image. They found that both 
the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the top 20% and the bottom 20% had increased with 
+0.05; increasing inequality. However Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama (2015) found that if 
inflation would stay around 2%, it would generate more economic growth than inequality 
resulting in inclusive growth. Unless inflation exceeds the 2% target resulting in an 
overburdened monetary policy and no further structural reform. In this case inequality would 
increase(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, p.22). After an inflation hike in 2014 the rate 
quickly plummeted to 0%, see figure 5, meaning that it did not stay around 2% and therefore 
did not generate inclusive growth but more inequality. The effects of the second arrow; 
monetary policy on asset price are usually immediate since stock markets tend to react to 
them instantaneous(Saiki & Frost, 
2014, p.4450). Saiki & Frost (2014) 
found that expansionary monetary 
policy positively influences the 
Gini coefficient. Over 10 quarters 
‘a one-standard deviation shock to 
the monetary base to GDP has a 
cumulative upward impact of 
about 0.012 on the Gini coefficient, 
which is equivalent to two times 
the standard deviation of the Gini 
coefficient during our sample 
 
Figure 6 Saiki & Frost, 2014, p.14 
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period [2008Q4 to 2013Q4]. This means that income inequality increases as a result of 
monetary shocks to an economically meaningful extent’(Saiki & Frost, 2014, pp.13-14).  
Conclusion 
Both researches on the effects of the first two arrows of Abenomics argue that it generally 
increased inequality by 0.05 and 0.012 Gini points. In order to also generate long term growth 
and make this growth inclusive, Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama argue that structural reforms, 
the third arrow of Abenomics needs to be launched completely(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 
2015, p.22). Saiki & Frost conclude that if only monetary policy is implemented, the 
economic and social impact might be negative because the inequality mainly works through 
shocks to capital wealth rather than labor income(Saiki & Frost, 2014, p.4453).  
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Abe’s third arrow 
 
In order for Abenomics to fully succeed in both causing economic growth and decreasing 
inequality, the first two arrows need to be complemented with the third arrow; structural 
reforms(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, p.22). However, unlike Korea with similar labor 
market structure and culture, Japan has not formulated concrete laws or policies(Choi, 2016, 
pp.5-6). The third arrow of Abenomics is the most ill-defined arrow. Because of opposition 
within the LDP, the reforms are debated at every stage, following a non-linear track and 
sometimes making the process of reform very incoherent. This debating process is the reason 
of the slow nature of implementation of reforms in Japan(Tiberghien, 2014, p.27). The third 
arrow was first described as a package of structural reforms that would generate long-term 
growth in Japan mainly aimed at the supply-side, however no concrete policies were put 
forward. It included many ‘possible’ reforms of (de)regulation11, gender equality, medical 
reforms and special economic zones but did not discuss policies that could aid Japan with its 
diminishing working population; immigration and labor deregulation. The LDP feared that 
there would be no support for the structural reforms that could influence the businesses and 
regular employees negatively. However, some authors saw Japans’ efforts to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a window of opportunity to implement structural 
reforms(Tiberghien, 2014, pp.51-52). Indeed, at first labor deregulation was not part of the 
proposed reforms, but soon relaxation of labor market rigidities was added to the list of 
reforms(Hausman & Wieland, 2014, p.3).  
 
Now the reforms planned under the third arrow include an increase in labor participation and 
a reduction of excessive labor 
market duality(Aoyagi, Ganelli & 
Murayama, 2015, p.4). But exact 
policies have not been formulated. 
However, recently the Abe 
administration has put forward a 
plan of ichiokusokatsuyaku’ or 
‘Dynamic engagement of all 
Citizens’. It basically replaces the 
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 But not of labor 
 
Figure 7 Elderly population (total, % of population) OECD, 2014, 
https://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm#indicator-chart 
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Figure 8 Labor input and productivity OECD, 2014, p.4 
 
third arrow of Abenomics. The structural problems addressed in ichiokusokatsuyaku are the 
declining birth rate and the ageing society that have indeed contributed to growing inequality. 
In this policy, the main idea is that every person can ‘follow their dreams’. The idea is that 
everyone, women and elderly included, play an active role in society and in order to achieve 
this eliminate policies that obstruct this. Two of the supporting pillars for ichiokusokatsuyaku 
are childcare support that should raise the birth-rate from 1.2 to 1.8 and the other is to provide 
more social security so instead of taking care of their elderly parents their children are able to 
remain employed(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015). A more concrete plan is 
expected soon, so unfortunately we are unable to research the effects of ichiokusokatsuyaku 
on inequality but we can predict the possible effects.  
 
Womenomics  
As described in ‘problems of the Japanese labor market’, the Japanese society is ageing. 
Which means that the elderly make up an increasingly larger part of the population which 
results in a decrease in labor participation(Aoyagi, Ganelli & Murayama, 2015, p.7). Labor 
productivity in Japan has always been low compared to other OECD countries and a relatively 
high labor input used to compensate for the low productivity which can be seen in figure 8. 
However, this is no longer feasible since the labor input is decreasing because of the ageing 
society(OECD, 2014, pp.3-4). One way to increase labor participation without immigration is 
to boost the female labor participation (FLP) rate(Aoyagi & Ganelli, 2015, pp.112-114). 
Recently, Abe Shinzo’s policies to boost the FLP have received more attention. One of the 
plans formulated in his policies are for women to hold 30% of the supervisory positions in all 
fields by 2020 and shine in their positions, calling it ‘womenomics’. However at the current 
pace the plans are already 15 years behind schedule(Reynolds, Shimodoi and Taniguchi, 
2016).  
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It remains difficult for women to advance in their careers in the primary sector after child-
birth because of the seniority-based system and the rarity of mid-career hiring. Women in the 
private sector and national government employees employed in the regions do not get 
promoted as often as their male counterparts, especially after giving birth(Reynolds, Shimodoi 
and Taniguchi, 2016). Because women are thrown off their career path after giving birth, most 
women in the private sector work in (poorly paid) part-time jobs or stop working completely 
(60%) after childbirth(Aoyagi & Ganelli, 2015, p.113). The government has put emphasis on 
increasing the supply of child daycare. However demand still largely exceeds supply. Another 
barrier for fulltime female employment is the tax-system, which allows households that have 
an income below 1.03 million yen to claim dependent exemption. Females often work part-
time even if they would want to work full-time in order not the cross the threshold. Because 
hourly pay is lower in part-time positions this results in a lower income for the household 
thereby creating income inequality(Aoyagi & Ganelli, 2015, p.230). However, 
ichiokusokatsuyaku contains a proposal that considers to raise the exemption tax for married 
couples from 1.03 to 1.30 million yen(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015, pp.7-
10). This might slightly remove the disincentive for women to find full-time employment as 
to not exceed the barrier of tax exemption.  
 
Around 64% of the increase in inequality can be contributed to an ageing population and 25% 
to decreasing household sizes(Takanami, 2010, p.7). The solution is not to ‘just have more 
babies’. In order to increase the birth-rate it is necessary to look at the structural causes 
thereof. If ichiokusokatsuyaku could successfully address the structural problems women face 
when they try to combine a job with childcare, it would address a significant part of the 
causes of the increased inequality. In order to stimulate the birth-rate, the policies seek to 
create ‘favorable’ situations for the youth to encourage them in marriage, child-birth etc. In 
order to do this the government says it will aim to help youth find employment ‘smoothly’ by 
promoting non-regular employees to regular positions, improving their working conditions 
and expanding the coverage of employment security(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
2015, p.5). The government then elaborates on the improvement of working conditions, 
stating that it wishes to promote various forms of flexible working and an ‘improvement of 
long working hours’. The government intends to encourage the private sectors to enact these 
policies and write reports about the development, but it does not state goals or standards that 
these businesses need to comply to (yet). Businesses are expected to invest in human 
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resources, R&D activities and equipment to stimulate productivity and promote health 
insurance in order for this to work. But again, no standards are set.  
 
Another, and probably the vaguest and most important statement is that it hopes to promote a 
‘new mentality’ for men to improve the working environment by for example promoting 
parental leave for fathers(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015, p.5). This change in 
mentality is indeed very important to improve the working environment, because prejudices 
about women, childcare and the role of the father often obstruct FLP. How to construct this 
change in mentality is not addressed, except for the statement that the legal systems’ response 
to disadvantageous treatment towards employees who leave work for childcare will be 
‘considered’(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015, p.11). It is not possible to 
measure to what extent this changed mentality would influence FLP and thereby inequality 
but it is important to take into consideration that efforts are made to improve the working 
lives of women. The amount of female workers has increased with approximately 1 million 
women and the number of women who hold management positions in the private sector has 
increased from 6.9% in 2012 to 8.7% in 2015(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2016). 
This is far behind the plan to increase this to 30%, but progress is being made. 
Ageing population 
In addition to boost female participation and birth rate, ichiokusokatsuyaku also deals with the 
elderly. The policy advocates more social security aimed to provide better care for the elderly 
so their children are able to remain in the work force; about 101.000 people left the work-
force between 2011-2012 in order to provide care(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
2015, p.3). In order to get this number down ichiokusokatsuyaku states that the government 
will improve supply of nursing services, but also improve working conditions, facilities and 
productivity in the nursing business(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015, p.6). In 
order to encourage the elderly to become more independent, the government seeks to offer 
them employment opportunities, promote the extension of healthy life expectancy and raise 
their overall incomes (including pensions)(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015, 
p.6). These policy proposals remain rather vague as well. By increasing employment of the 
elderly and their children, labor supply would increase. However, productivity is not 
necessarily stimulated. It argues for the same ‘improvement of working conditions’ in the 
nursing sector as for the youth in order to improve productivity, but again the exact cause-
effect is not explained and remains vague. If the elderly would enter the work-force again in 
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order to become more independent, this would possibly improve income inequality because 
the elderly would receive more income. It also means that jobs need to be created for both the 
youth and the elderly while simultaneously 
improve the hours and working conditions of 
these jobs and promote non-regular employees to 
regular positions in order to lower labor market 
duality which seems like a rigorous task for the 
government to do all at once. Especially since 
earlier in the crisis working elderly were offered 
early retirement in order to provide job 
opportunities for young people, the capacity of 
the government to create jobs for the elderly that 
also abide to favorable working conditions seems 
rather over-stated.  
 
The effect on inequality 
Since the installment of the Abe administration, unemployment levels have dropped, see 
figure 9, simultaneously part-time employment has risen. Even if employment has risen, 
inequality has not diminished because the sort of employment people get into is part-time 
employment which is non-regular, see figure 10. Most of the people who end up working in 
non-regular employment actually want to work full-time but are unable to do so because most 
of the new jobs created are non-
regular, see figure 13. Since the 
wages of non-regular employees 
are lower than those in regular 
employment and because of the 
worse working conditions 
including the lack of opportunities 
to invest in the accumulation of 
human capital, there is an increase 
in income inequality.  
 
 
 
Figure 9 Unemployment Rate  
Ministery of Health, Labour and Welfare 
 
 
Figure 10 Part-time and full-time ratio 
http://lipperalpha.financial.thomsonreuters.com/2014/09/news-charts-
japans-hidden-unemployment-problem/ 
 
Pam van Ipenburg 
22 
 
 
 
The female employment rate has risen from 60.73 in 2010 to 64.67 in 2015; and the FLP has 
risen from 63.2 in 2010 to 65.4 in 2015. These are the approximately one million women who 
have entered the workforce and fly the banner for ‘womenomics’. The jobs these women 
usually get into are non-regular. Indeed female participation has risen simultaneously with 
part-time employment. The amount of women in leadership positions is far behind the goal of 
30% and the barriers to full-time female employment have remained intact. The tax 
exemption law is still in place, and even if revised from 1.03 to 1.30 it is still there and will 
cause some women to work part-time instead of full-time where they will receive lower 
wages. During Abenomics, the wages have remained flat while at the same time GDP has 
risen. Even though there are plans to raise the wages and make the wages for non-regular and 
regular employment more equal, this has not been implemented yet. Even though the labor 
market duality seems to have increased, it must be mentioned that this is mainly due to an 
increase in part-time employment. Self-employment rates have remained steady while 
temporary employment rates have dropped from 13.75% in 2010 to 7.63% in 2014.  
 
Figure 12 Part-time employment rate 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/part-time-employment 
 
 
Figure 11 Temporary Employment Rate OECD.org 
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Conclusion 
Under Abenomics unemployment has fallen and the employment rate has gone up. However, 
simultaneously there has been an increase in the amounts of part-time employment created as 
opposed to full-time employment. This is also called the hidden unemployment of Japan. 
Many people would wish to work fulltime but are unable to do so because the jobs created are 
non-regular, see figure 13. Part-time employment in percentage of total employment created 
(figure 10) has risen. The hourly wages of part-time employees are about 60% lower than that 
of full-time employees, indicating a high level of labor market duality which causes higher 
income inequality Thus we can see that the Japanese labor market is one of the causes of the 
higher income inequality in Japan.  
The government has identified the labor market structure as problematic too. The new plan 
serves as a replacement for the third arrow that was never fully launched and wants to 
increase labor participation and productivity. In order to do this the Japanese government 
wants to address structural problems such as the long working hours, the minimum wage, the 
tax exemption ceiling and other working conditions. If these reforms were fully implemented 
they would indeed lower inequality by both tackling the working conditions in the dual labor 
market and increasing the birthrate. This would lead to less inequality since the ageing society 
is a cause of the rise in inequality. However, we should be skeptical about the capabilities of 
these ‘Urgent Reforms’. To create jobs for both the elderly and youth that fulfill the improved 
working conditions would be very challenging. To have both a flexible workforce and 
simultaneously shift the youth from non-regular to regular employment seems contradictory. 
Furthermore, some newspapers already argue that the new plan might be used to regain voters’ 
sympathy for the next general elections. Most of the voters have seen their economic 
condition worsen as a result of the higher consumption tax and flat wages. As we have seen, it 
is very difficult to implement reforms in Japan since they first have to be accepted in the Diet 
(the parliament). This is a difficult task since the LDP party members are not bound to a party 
ideology and some are against structural reforms. During this process, some of these reforms 
might be blocked or altered, so we cannot yet pass a judgment on the effects the new policies 
might have. However, that a policy is formulated and addresses the root of the problem is 
important and might have an effect over the longer term. 
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Figure 13 Reasons for Non-Regular Employees to Choose the Current Work Style (Asao, 2011, p.12) 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the relationship between labor market duality and inequality and 
applied it to the Japanese case of the third arrow of Abenomics. As a result of the economic 
crisis of the 1990s there has been a shift from the life-long employment system towards non-
regular employment. An increase in the share of non-regular employment causes higher 
inequality because the working conditions and wages as well as the capacity to acquire human 
capital and intercompany mobility are significantly lower than in regular employment. This 
labor market duality has become increasingly segmented in Japanese society. In 2012 Abe 
Shinzo launched a plan to generate economic growth through the launch of three arrows; 
monetary expansion, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms. Saiki & Frost (2014) and Aoyagi, 
Ganelli & Murayama (2015) argued that it was only possible to generate inclusive economic 
growth if the third arrow of structural reforms was fully launched. From the beginning, the 
third arrow’s contents were heavily debated and no structural reforms were implemented. 
Overall, the third arrow has not succeeded in addressing the causes of increased inequality; 
ageing society and labor market duality.  
In fact, the amount of NSW has risen opposed to regular work since Abe came to power. Even 
though people perceive the inequalities between non-regular and regular employment as 
unfair and undesirable they have no choice but to enter non-regular positions thereby 
generating less income and lowering their productivity as well. The higher amount of people 
who work in non-regular jobs during the reign of Abe has increased income inequalities 
among Japanese. 
The new plan ichiokusokatsuyaku is aimed to solve the structural problems. It proposes to 
raise the birth-rate in order to address the ageing society that causes higher levels of inequality. 
The causes of the low birth-rate such as the inability for young couples to generate enough 
income to pay the costs of raising a child would be solved by improving the working 
conditions creating a shift from non-regular to regular employment and increasing the amount 
of child-care facilities such as daycares. Ichiokusokatsuyaku has not been implemented yet 
and few goals have been defined clearly. However it is obvious that the ichiokusokatsuyaku is 
the replacement of the third arrow which has failed to address the inequalities caused by 
market duality. 
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Of course, we cannot know what would have happened to inequality in Japan had Abenomics 
not been implemented, so we do not know whether inequalities would have continued to grow 
without it. Neither can we now what would have happened if policies had been implemented 
to reduce the level of NSW. Companies might have created more regular jobs but they also 
might have decided not to hire, leading to increased levels of unemployment. Or, as was the 
case in Korea, wage and non-wage benefits of non-targeted non-regular workers and regular 
employees might have been cut in order to comply to the anti-discrimination law that 
protected targeted non-regular employees(Choi, 2016 pp.14-16). However, we know that the 
income of some non-regular workers are low compared to regular workers and almost the 
same for unemployed persons on benefits
12
. Moreover, we have seen that the probability of 
becoming a regular employee is the same for the unemployed and most non-regular 
employees. The high amounts of non-regular employment increase income inequality because 
of these conditions.  
With both the ichiokusokatsuyaku and the limits of what we can research in the back of our 
minds, we can conclude that the effect of the third arrow on equality has been negative. It is 
not necessarily because of what it has done but more about what it did not do; the Abe 
administration has shot short of its goal to increase the amount of women in the work-force 
and in leading positions, it has not decreased the amount of NSW and they have not resolved 
the wage-gaps, lower mobility and human capital accumulation disparities and neither have 
they addressed the problems of the ageing society. Instead, we see that the amount of people 
in NSW has increased and created jobs are often non-regular. Because of this, inequality 
levels have not dropped. The amount of people working in NSW and the flat wages has 
influenced equality negatively. Because of the higher income inequality, people perceive the 
Japanese society as ‘increasingly unfair’.  
  
  
                                                          
12
 As described in Theoretical Framework: Labor market duality 
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